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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1# What are the requirements before summary judgment 
may be granted? 
2. What are the requirements before pleadings may 
be stricken? 
3. What are the requirements before appellant's 
affidavit in opposition of summary judgment may be stricken? 
4. Do material facts exist to give rise to both 
contract and tort causes of action? 
5. Did facts exist to establish that criminal process 
was improperly pursued in an attempt to enforce a civil debt? 
6. Was abuse of process present by plaintiffs1 influence 
in the criminal prosecution? 
1. Were grounds established for defamation? 
8. Were grounds established for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress? 
9. Were grounds established for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action based upon fraud -- specifically, that 
the appellant knew at the time he submitted a stolen vehicle claim 
to his insurance company, AMICA Mutual Insurance, and at the time 
payment was received, that his vehicle was In possession of an auto 
body shop which had performed repairs to the vehicle and which 
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asserted a lien against the automobile. This action arose out of 
the same facts which gave rise to the criminal prosecution of 
appellant wherein he was accused of insurance fraud, tried, and 
acquitted by a jury in April, 1985. One week after this acquittal, 
Respondent AMICA Mutual Insurance Company, hereinafter "AMICA," 
filed this instant civil action alleging the same facts as the 
basis for its cause of action for fraud. 
The appellant counter-claimed alleging generally that 
Respondent AMICA breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with its own insured by initiating and pursuing the criminal action, 
which amounted to per se defamation and malicious prosecution. 
Both parties later amended their pleadings, specifying individual 
causes of action. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the following motions came for hearing: 
1. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
2. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Companyfs Motion to 
Strike Pleadings; 
3. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion 
to Strike Affidavits in Opposition; 
4. Third-Party Defendant National Automobile Theft 
Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; and, 
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5. Third-Party Defendants James M. Black, Barbara J. 
Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Plaintiff's and Third-Party 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Motions to Strike 
Affidavits, and Motions to Strike Defendant's Pleadings. The date 
of judgment was October 31, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW 
In July, 1981, appellant's mother was involved in a car 
accident while driving a 1980 Dodge Mirada automobile which the 
appellant had leased and allowed his mother to use. The vehicle 
was insured under a policy issued by AMICA. The vehicle was ordered 
towed by the Utah Highway Patrol and was taken to Pioneer Dodge, 
the nearest Dodge dealer to the site of the accident. Several days 
later, appellant alleges he was prevented from paying for the towing 
charges and retrieving his vehicle by officials of Pioneer Dodge 
who claimed they had already begun unauthorized repairs. Appellant 
had just prior to this time entered into an agreement to purchase 
a Chevrolet dealership in Heber City, Utah, and wanted to have the 
car repaired there. 
Appellant's dispute with Pioneer Dodge continued for some 
ten months during which time the appellant was also involved in 
litigation to secure his Chevrolet dealership. When the appellant 
finally was about to open his car dealership, he went to Pioneer 
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Dodge and disputed again their repair work and lack of authorization. 
In May, 1982, the appellant removed the vehicle from Pioneer Dodge 
without paying any repair bills. He returned several days later 
and argued with Wayne Schoenfeld, owner of Pioneer Dodge, over these 
issues. Appellant told Schoenfeld that he was going to sell the 
car at the next auto auction and sue Pioneer Dodge for the difference 
between its present value and the value at the time of the accident. 
About one week later, on June 9, 1982, as appellant 
prepared to take the car to auction, it turned up missing from the 
driveway of his residence in Salt Lake County. He called the 
sheriff's office who investigated and noted that no notice had been 
given to them of any repossession, which is standard practice by 
auto dealers prior to making a repossessiona 
Appellant proceeded to file a stolen vehicle report with 
the sheriff's office and with AMIGA, for which he was paid the sum 
of $6,925.00 for the total loss of his car. Appellant alleges he 
knew nothing further on this matter until his arrest some two years 
later. 
AMICA alleges that appellant knew his car had been 
repossessed by Pioneer Dodge and relies on the telephone call Wayne 
Schoenfeld alleges took place between himself and appellant. AMICA 
states it did not learn of the car's whereabouts until it had 
already been sold to a third-party purchaser to satisfy the unpaid 
repair bill at Pioneer Dodge. 
Appellant alleges, based upon the documents he obtained 
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during the criminal proceedings, that AMICA and third parties 
Black, Guiver, and National Automobile Theft Bureau, hereinafter 
l!NATB," made affirmative efforts to push and further the prosecu-
tion of appellant as a means to collect the money previously paid 
to him for his vehicle total loss. Appellant alleges that this 
influence and pressure was exerted upon the sheriff1s office inves-
tigation and upon the county attorney1s office in order to secure a 
criminal action against the appellant which would be cheaper and 
easier than suing him for the disputed sum. Furthermore, the 
appellant was never contacted during this two year period by anyone 
regarding any dispute over the payment of any insurance settlement 
regarding this vehicle. 
Appellant claims that the investigation and instigation 
of criminal charges against him was done maliciously and wrongfully 
giving rise to his various causes of action against AMICA and third 
parties. The third parties are the insurance adjusters, James M. 
Black and R. LaMar Guiver, and NATB. Appellant alleges that the 
facts in this case support his causes of action for First Party 
Bad Faith, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, Per Se Defamation, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligence. 
Appellant alleges that the repeated acts of AMICA, Black, 
Guiver, and NATB, as evidenced by their own documents, records, 
and admissions during testimony, clearly establish the factual basis 
to support his various causes of action. 
Upon motions by AMICA and third parties, the lower court 
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g r a n t e d summary judgment on a l l of a p p e l l a n t f s causes of a c t i o n 
and a l s o o rde red s t r i c k e n a l l of a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s . 
This o r d e r i s a l s o p a r t of t h i s a p p e a l , as t h e s e a f f i d a v i t s a re 
t e s t imony as t o p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s and knowledge of w i t n e s s e s , 
and no grounds e x i s t t o s t r i k e such t e s t i m o n y . However, most of 
t h e t e s t imony w i t h i n t h e s e a f f i d a v i t s p e r t a i n s t o AMICA's motion 
t o s t r i k e S c h e t t l e r f s p l e a d i n g s , fo r which t h e lower c o u r t r e s e r v e d 
any r u l i n g . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
The lower cou r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g summary judgment and 
s t r i k i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p leadings- and a f f i d a v i t s in o p p o s i t i o n as a 
m a t t e r of law, and t h e r e e x i s t e d m a t e r i a l d i s p u t e d f a c t s . 
Facts existed to establish that criminal process was 
improperly pursued in an attempt to enforce a civil debt. 
There was abuse of process present by plaintiffs1 influence 
in the criminal prosecution. 
Grounds were established for defamation. 
Grounds were established for intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be 
reserved and the case remanded for trial by jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST 
IN THIS CASE WHERE ACTS CONSTITUTING 
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BREACH OF CONTRACT ALSO RESULT IN 
BREACHES OF DUTY THAT ARE INDEPENDENT 
OF THE CONTRACT AND GIVE RISE TO 
CAUSES OF ACTION IN TORT. 
The case at bar presents a first-party relationship 
between an insurer and its insured. Hence, the duties and obliga-
tions of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. 
Ordinarily, without more, a breach of those implied or expressed 
duties can give rise only to a cause of action in contracts, not 
one in torts. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchangp, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985). However, the Utah Supreme Court writes: 
We recognize that in some capes the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also 
result in breaches of duty tfiat are inde-
pendent of the contract and (that may give 
rise to causes of action in tort. Hal 
Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmericja, 657 P.2d 
at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire 
Ins. Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, 
the law of this state recognizes a duty to 
refrain from intentionally causing severe 
emotional distress to others. Samms v. 
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 
(Utah 1961). Thus, intentional and out-
rageous conduct by an insurer against an 
insured, coupled with a failure to bargain, 
could conceivably result in port liability 
independent of (and concurrent with) 
liability for breach of contract. 
Additionally, the facts that give rise to 
a breach of the duty to bargain in good 
faith could also amount to fraudulent 
activity, rendering an insurer independently 
liable for damages flowing from the fraud. 
See Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. 
App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 7641(1968). 
Also, under various unfair practices acts, 
there may be statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action. 
E.g., UCA 1953, §31-27-1 to ^ 4. 
Id., at 800, n. 3. 
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In reviewing the implied contractual obligation to 
perform a f i r s t -par ty insurance contract in good fai th, the Court 
notes : 
Few cases define the implied contractual 
obligation to perform a first-party 
insurance contract in good faith. However, 
because the considerations are similar, 
we freely look to the tort cases that have 
described the incidence of the duty of 
good faith in the context of first-party 
insurance contracts. From those cases 
and from our own analysis of the obligations 
undertaken by the parties, we conclude that 
the implied obligation of good faith per-
formance contemplates, at the very least, 
that the insurer will diligently investigate 
the.facts to enable it to determine whether 
a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the 
claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling 
the claim. 
Id., at 801. 
In the case at bar, the record indicates that a genuine 
issue of material fact clearly exists whether Mr. Schettler knew 
the automobile in question was stolen, and whether AMICA diligently 
investigated the facts to enable it to determine whether a valid 
mechanic's lien existed, to name but two of the factual problems 
in this case. 
In addition the Court states: 
The duty of good faith also requires the 
insurer to "deal with layman as layman 
and not as experts in the subtleties of 
law and underwriting11 and to refrain 
from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the 
contract. 
Id. , (citations omitted). 
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Clearly, a genuine issue of material fact also exists 
whether AMICA, particularly in conjunction with the third parties, 
breached its duty of good faith in dealing with layman as layman, 
and whether through its pursuit of the criminal matter refrained 
from actions that would injure Mr. Schettlerfs ability to obtain 
the benefits of contract. Such distinctions are significant 
because: 
These performances [of good faith] are 
the essence of what the insured has 
bargained and paid for, and the insurer 
has the obligation to perform them. 
When an insurer has breached this duty, 
it is liable for damages suffered in 
consequence of that breach. 
Id., (citations omitted). 
POINT II 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT CONDEMNS THE USE 
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS TO ENFORCE A 
CIVIL DEBT. 
This case involves the use of the criminal process to 
enforce a civil debt. The Utah Supreme Court and Utah statute, 
§76-19-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, have both condemned 
this approach even if the complainant is owed the debt. Greenwell 
v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 575 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1978); Haas v. 
Emmett, 23 Utah 2d 138, 459 P.2d 432 (Utah 1969). Malicious pros-
ecution may be used to punish such conduct. Haas v. Emmett, supra; 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 193-94, 299 P.2d 
622, 626 (Utah 1956). The Utah Supreme Court occasionally implied 
defendantfs bad faith from the mere effort to call on the police. 
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Utah a l so borrows from the malicious prosecut ion doctr ine 
to allow s u i t s for the wrongful br inging of c i v i l a c t i o n s . Baird 
v. In t e rna t iona l School Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (1976); Perkins 
v. Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 503 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1972). Often the 
term malicious prosecut ion i s used for these a c t i o n s . Leigh Furnitur< 
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-309 (Utah 1982); Perkins v. Stephens, 
supra. The Court has recognized such act ions for using groundless 
c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n to damage ano ther ' s bus iness . Leigh Furni ture v. 
Isom, supra, a t 309. 
In the case a t bar , appel lant properly pleaded the above 
cause and genuine issues of mate r ia l fact ex i s t as to the conduct 
of an independent po l ice i nves t iga t ion and an independent deputy 
county a t torney and the influence of AMIGA and t h i r d - p a r t y 
respondents in a p p e l l a n t ' s cr iminal prosecut ion . 
POINT I I I 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS 
WHETHER THE INFLUENCE OF AMIGA AND THE 
THIRD-PARTY RESPONDENTS IN APPELLANT'S 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION CONSTITUTES ABUSE 
OF PROCESS. 
A variant of the malicious prosecution action is the action 
for abuse of process. The core of the action is a "perversion of 
the process to accomplish some improper purpose, such as compelling 
its victim to do something which he would not otherwise be legally 
obligated to do.1' Crease v. Pleasant Grove, 30 Utah 2d 451, 519 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1974); see, Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985), 
And, the cause of action may arise even though an action has been 
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properly started and process lawfully issued. Crease v. Pleasant 
Grove, supra, 519 P.2d at 890. 
In the case at ba r , appel lant properly pleaded tha t 
cause and a genuine i ssue of mater ia l fact ex i s t s as to whether 
the act ion by the above-mentioned pa r t i e s rose to such a l eve l . 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION IS 
ACTIONABLE. 
A prima facie case of defamation, as defined in 
RESTATEMENT (2d) TORTS, §588 (1977), includes four main elements: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 
(c) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part 
of the publisher; and, 
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective 
of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the 
publication. 
Under the common law, publishers of defamatory falsehoods 
concerning private individuals were held strictly liable. Herbert 
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159, n. 4 (1979). 
Utah statutes define libel or slander as !fa malicious 
defamation. . . tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, 
or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or 
publish the natural defects of one who is ^live, and thereby expose 
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.11 UCA, §45-2-2, UCA, 
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§76-9-501 substitutes "defame or darken" for "blacken." a 1905 
Utah Supreme Court case, Nichols v. Daily Reporter, offered a 
similar definition: 
...derogatory or disparaging words 
which impute to a person the commission 
of a crime or degradation of character, 
or which have a tendency to injuriously 
affect him in his office or trust, 
profession, trade, calling, or business, 
or which tend to degrade him in society, 
or expose him to public hatred, contempt, 
or ridicule. 
30 Utah 74, 77, 83 Pac. 573, 574 (1905). The Nichols case continues 
to be cited in recent Supreme Court opinions. E.g., Auto West Inc. 
v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah 1984). In a 1975 opinion the 
Utah Supreme Court described the "traditional" requirement of libel 
and slander as being "to hold a person up to hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule, or to injure him in his business or vocation." Prince 
v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975). 
Utah statutes distinguish between libel and slander. 
Libel is defamation "expressed either by printing or by signs or 
pictures or the like...." UCA, §45-2-2(1). Slander is "any libel 
communicated by spoken words." Id., at §45-2-2(2). The distinction 
is important primarily in determining what evidence of damages 
must be presented. 
Utah allows an action for slander to proceed without an 
allegation of special harm only if the words fall into one of four 
categories: "(1) charge of criminal conduct; (2) charge of a 
loathesome disease; (3) charge of conduct that is incompatible with 
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the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or office; 
and (4) charge of the unchastity of a woman.!f Daum v. Gillman, 
967 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983); All red v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 
(1979). In the instant case, while there is no question but that 
slander exists, libel may also be present. Charges of criminal 
conduct as well as a charge of conduct that is incompatible with 
the exercise of a lawful business, trade, or profession exists. 
In slander cases damage to reputations is presumed from the nature 
of the words and plaintiff need not show specific damage. 
A similar damage requirement applies in libel cases. 
Rather than using the four slander categories, a libel per se is 
one which from its nature must as a natural consequence cause 
plaintiff "pecuniary harm.11 Western States Title Ins. Co. v. 
Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 72, 415 P.2d 316, 317 (Utah 1966); Nichols 
v. Daily Reporter, supra, 30 Utah at 77, 83 Pac. at 574. A libel 
per se requires no specific showing of damages since damages are 
presumed. 
In addition, the Court has either held or refrained from 
questioning findings by lower courts that it was defamatory per se 
to state plaintiff was a "clever crook" and "stealing from his 
own children," Prince v. Peterson, supra, See similarly, Auto 
West Inc. v. Baggs, supra; Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th 
Cir. 1981)("bagman for Spiro Agnew"); Simpson v. Steen, 127 F.Supp. 
132 (D. Utah 1954) ("claim jumping"); and had "forged his mother's 
name to a check and taken the money," Hales v. Commercial Bank, 
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114 Utah 186, 197 P. 2d 910 (Utah 1948). 
Court opinions further require that the defamatory 
language be "of and concerning11 the plaintiff. Kirkham v. 
Sweet ring, 108 Utah 397, 400, 160 P. 2d 435, 437 (1945); Malouf v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Utah 175, 191, 283 Pac. 1065, 1069 
(1929); Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 51 Utah 322, 170 Pac. 770 
(1918); Burton v. Matt son, 50 Utah 133, 166 Pac. 979 (1917) (when 
it is obvious defamation concerns plaintiff it need not be pleaded 
that words are "of and concerning him"). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moreover, take a 
non-technical approach to pleading defamatory matters. Rule 9(j)(l) 
does not require plaintiff to "set forth any extrinsic facts showing 
the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter... but it 
is sufficient to state generally the same was published or spoken 
concerning the plaintiff." 
Here, the record clearly indicates that a defamatory 
statement was published or spoken concerning Mr. Schettler. As 
such, as a private citizen, Mr. Schettler may properly proceed in 
this action. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS AGAINST CROSS-
CLAIMANTS PROPERLY ESTABLISH A CLAIM 
FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a person flwho 
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another through 
-14-
extreme and outrageous conduct is liable to that person for any 
resulting damages." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 
(Utah 1985), citing Restatement of Torts 2d, §46. See also, 
Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188, 298-300 (D.Utah 1982), afffd., 
745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984). Neither bodily contact nor physical 
injury is required. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 
(Utah 1961). Defendant is liable if he intended to inflict emotional 
distress or reasonably should have known that distress would result. 
The Court has recognized that the action may lie when a 
defendant made repeated proposals for sexual relations to a married 
woman, Samms v. Eccles, supra, and when a tenant was forcefully 
evicted by the defendant who unlawfully retained the tenant's per-
sonal possessions. Pentecost v. Harward, supra. 
In the case at bar, appellant properly pleaded the above 
cause and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
the actions of AMICA and the third parties fall within these 
parameters. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT PROPERLY PLEADED THE ELEMENTS 
OF NEGLIGENCE AND A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER AMICA 
AND THE THIRD-PARTY RESPONDENTS OWED 
A DUTY OF DUE CARE TO APPELLANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the "essential 
elements11 of a negligence action as: "(1) a duty of reasonable care 
owed by the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; 
(3) the causation, both actually and proximately, of injury; and 
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(4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff.11 Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). See_ also, Allen v. United 
States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984). 
The focal point in the case at bar is the breach of duty. 
That is typically a jury question. Williams v. Melby, supra, at 
727; Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); Jackson v. 
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Insurance, 594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979); Jensen v. 
Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 406, 367 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1962). 
In the case at bar, the question exists as to whether 
AMICA or any of the third parties owed any duty to appellant to more 
fully investigate the instant facts prior to pursuing criminal 
prosecution and whether they owed appellant a duty of informing 
him of a dispute prior to having him arrested. In addition, a 
question exists whether appellant has a separate negligence action 
or whether it is incorporated into his Bad Faith action. 
CONCLUSION 
For t h e r easons s t a t e d above, a p p e l l a n t r e q u e s t s t h e 
Court t o r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g of P l a i n t i f f ' s and 
T h i r d - P a r t y Defendants ' Motions fo r Summary Judgment, Motion t o 
S t r i k e A f f i d a v i t s , and Motions t o S t r i k e Defendan t ' s P l e a d i n g s . 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appe l l an t r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s o r a l argument under 
Category No. 1 3 ( b ) . 
- 1 6 -
[CO 
Respectfully submitted this \ M-t^ -j^ day of September, 
1987. 
HANSEN & HANSEN 
800 Bo scon Building 
9 Exchange P lace 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2467 
At to rneys fo r Appe l lan t 
By X-TC^CK , 4 - A ^ W
 A c , 
> h i r L. Hansen ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e _ M | £ ^ > c r a y of September, 
1987, four (4) copies of Br i e f of Appe l l an t were served on each of 
t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
S. Baird Morgan, Esq, 
Mark J . Tay lo r , Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
At torneys fo r Respondent 
S ix th F loo r Boston Bui ld ing 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Robert R. Wal lace , E4q. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
At torneys fo r T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendants and Respondents 
175 So. West Temple, S u i t e 650 
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84101 
Wesley M. Lang, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
At torneys fo r T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendant and Respondent 
175 So. West Temple, S u i t e 510 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
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Lawrence L. Summerhays,#3l55 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
1 Civil No. 
• i 
For cause of action against defendant, the plaintiff 
complains and alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. That the plaintiff is, a mutual insurance company 
licensed and qualified to do business in the State of Utah. 
2. That the defendant ig a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. That at all times herein mentioned, AMICA 
Insurance Co, had issued to Carl F. Schettler, defendant 
herein, a policy of insurance covering his 1980 Dodge 8 
Mirada hardtop motor vehicle having an identification number 
of XH22GAR142858 . Said policy of insurance, among other 
coverages, included collision and comprehensive including 
theft, 
4. The insured vehicle was involved in an accident 
to* V ^n J*^1 a n d o n July 9, 1981, a repair estimate in the amount 
/rNx>^xof $2,965 was obtained for the repair of said vehicle at 
h^# Pioneer Dodge Center, Salt Lake City, Utah. The repairs were 
completed and the final repair bill amounted to the sum of 
$3#165.75. The insured submitted said bill to the plaintiff 
herein for payment and plaintiff made payment of the defendant's 
claim for the repairs by issuing and delivering its draft to th€ 
defendant herein, payable to defendant and Chrysler Credit 
Corporation, the financing agency for the defendant. 
5. The defendant/insured failed to make payment 
to Pioneer Dodge Center, the repairing garage and prior to 
June 9, 1982, the defendant/insured had his vehicle towed, from 
the Pioneer Dodge Center to his home without the consent, 
knowledge or permission of Pioneer Dodge Center; that on or 
about June 9, 1982, Pioneer Dodge Center located the vehicle 
at the home of the defendant herein and had the vehicle towed 
back to the Pioneer Dodge Center. 
6. On June 9, 1982 at about 6:34 p.m. the defendant 
reported the vehicle to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office as 
having been stolen from his premises. 
On or about the 10th day of June 1982, the insured 
called Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, owner of Pioneer Dodge Center and 
was told by Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld that the vehicle was at the 
Pioneer Dodge Center. On the 22nd day of June 1982, defendant/ 
insured completed a proof of loss form reporting the vehicle as 
having been stolen and delivered the same to the plaintiff/ 
insurance company-heraia^ 
7. On the 8th day of July 1982, the plaintiff/ 
surance company delivered its draft no. 1824946 in the sum of 
$6,925 payable to Carl F. Schettler and Chrysler Credit 
Corporation,to the defendant herein in payment of the theft/loss 
of his vehicle and the defendant deposited said draft and 
collected the amount thereof. 
8. At the time defendant filed his proof of loss 
claiming the vehicle was stolen, he knew that said vehicle was 
in the possession of Pioneer Dodge Center and that said company 
had a mechanic's lien on said vehicle for the reasonable value 
of the repairs that had been performed on said vehicle by 
said company and also knew that said Pioneer Dodge Center was 
entitled to the lawful possession of said vehicle by virtue 
of said mechanic's lien, that it was hot stolen and that the 
filing of a claim for the value of said vehicle under the 
policy of insurance constituted a fraud on the part of the 
defendant, against plaintiff/insurance co. 
9. As a proximate result £>f said fraudulent conduct 
upon the part of the defendant, the pfLaintiff sustained the 
following damages: 
1. Loss of $6,925.00, the amount paid to 
the insured/defendant in payment of the 
defendant's claim for the theft/loss of 
his vehicle together with interest thereon 
from the 8th day of July 1|982 to date of judgment. 
2. Costs of plaintiff's investigation by its 
own staff and those hired by plaintiff to 
investigate the theft/loss of said vehicle of 
defendant in the sum of $1,440.39. 
3. A reasonable attorney's fee necessarily 
incurred by plaintiff in its investigation 
of the theft and for the filing and handling 
of this lawsuit. 
4. Costs of court necessarily incurred in 
connection with the prosecution of this 
lawsuit. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment on its first 
cause of action as follows: 
1. Damages in the amount of $6,925.00 paid to the 
defendant for the theft/loss of his vehicle together with 
interest from the 8th day of July 1982 to the date of judgment. 
2. Costs of plaintiff's investigation of the alleged 
theft/loss of said vehicle in the sum of $1,440.39 plus interest 
3. A reasonable attorney's fee necessarily incurred 
by plaintiff in its investigation and the filing and handling 
of this lawsuit. 
4. Costs of court necessarily incurred in connection 
with the prosecution of this lawsuit. 
5. Such other and further relief as the court 
deems just and proper. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
10. For a second cause of action plaintiff adopts 
all of the allegations set forth in paragraph one through nine 
of the First Cause of Action as though the same were set out 
in full herein. 
11. That the conduct of the defendant in submitting 
c$^ c$&s c l a^ m ^or t h e t h e f t o f his automobile and accepting 
, V an^/cashing the draft issued in payment of the theft of the 
y^car when he knew that the same was in the possession of 
/ 
Pioneer Dodge Center, which had a right to hold it under its V* 
possessory lien for payment of the repair bill constituted a fraud 
against the plaintiff and plaintiff is entitled to recover 
punitive damages therefor. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for judgment on his 
Second Cause of Action by way of punitive damages in the sum 
of $100,000.00 and for such other relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Lawrence L. Summei^a^s 
Serve Defendant at: 
5893 Tolcate Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
t.\5?0ft 
J 1IAR0LD CALL 0540 
J|tAj«;orney for D e f e n d a n t / P l a i n t i f f 
.VuflW Uorth Main S t r e e t 
S u i t e 3 
mJfcSer Ci ty , Utah 84032 
Telephone: (801) 654-0742 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No. 
ROLD CALL 
IN«Y AT . . A * 
(N m a » «II I 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff 
«vs* 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant 
and 
CARL F." SCHETTLER, 
Third Party Plaintiff 
•vs* 
JAMES M. BLACK and 
BARBARA J. BLACK dba BLACK, 
NICHOLS & GUIVER and R. 
LaMAR GUIVER, 
Third Party Defendants 
Comes now the defendant and answers the Complaint of the 
plaintiff as follows: 
1. Said Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon whi< 
this court can grant relief. 
2. Admits the allegations of Paragraphs one and two of the 
First Cause of Action. 
.0 CALL 
AT L>V» 
3. Admits in Paragraph Three that the plaintiff did issue to 
the defendant a policy of insurance but denies that said policy of 
insurance was in effect at all times mentioned in Paragraph Three. 
4. In Paragraph-Four, this defendant admits the vehicle in 
question was involved in an accident but denies the other allega-
tions of said paragraph. 
5. Denies the allegations of Paragraph Five. 
6. Admits the first paragraph of Paragraph Six but denies the 
balance of said Paragraph Six. 
7. Admits the allegations of Paragraph Seven but denies 
Paragraphs Eight and Nine and denies every part of said Complaint 
that is not specifically admitted herein. 
8. Denies each and ever allegation of Paragraphs Ten and 
Eleven of the Second Cause of Action. 
COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
By way of Counterclaim and a further answer to the Complaint 
and as a Complaint against the Third Party Defendants, Defendant 
Schettler alleges as follows: 
1. Arnica Mutual Insurance Company is required by law to use 
Mgood faith, abstain from deception and practice honesty and equity 
in all insurance matters.11 The same responsibility rests upon its 
representatives and all have "the duty of preserving inviolate in-
tegrity of insurance.11 The plaintiff and third party defendants 
have violated this duty they owed to the Defendant Schettler in that 
-2-
(a) Plaintiff and third party defendants conspired to use 
the criminal process to attempt to force Defendant 
Schettler to pay money to the plaintiff; 
(b) Plaintiff and third party defendants knew for 13 
months that the motor vehicle had been located, but 
they failed to notify the defendant or discuss the ma 
ter with him, but conspired as to how they could use 
the criminal process to harass the defendant in an 
attempt to force him to pay money; 
(c) Plaintiff and third party defendants failed to protec 
the personal property belonging to Defendant Schettle 
that was in said automobile or aid or assist in its 
recovery or return of the Dealer Plates on said 
automobile; 
(d) The Salt Lake County Sheriff and Salt Lake County 
Attorneyfs Office finally agreed to issue a Warrant 
of Arrest against the Defendant Schettler and charge 
him with "Insurance Fraud", but only after they had 
been constantly urged and prodded by plaintiff and 
third party defendants even though the sheriff and 
county attorney at first said there was not sufficien 
evidence to arrest the defendant; 
(e) Plaintiff had a valid title to the motor vehicle in 
question and when the said vehicle was located about 
December 22, 1982, plaintiff could have claimed the 
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motor vehicle and recovered their loss, but they chose 
not to do so and violated the duty they owed the de-
fendant by using the criminal process in an attempt to 
force Schettler to pay the loss; 
(f) Plaintiff and third party defendants are aware that 
the second title issued to said motor vehicle through 
efforts of Pioneer Dodge, is void and invalid, but the 
plaintiff and third party defendants have taken no 
action to assert their valid title to said motor ve-
hicle but rather chose to charge Defendant Schettler 
with "Insurance Fraud11; 
(g) Plaintiff and third party defendants aided Pioneer 
Dodge in keeping the defendant from his property and 
assisted and aided Pioneer Dodge in keeping the loca-
tion of the motor vehicle secret from defendant, 
2. That as a direct result of plaintiff and third party defen-
dants' actions, Defendant Schettler has suffered extreme mental 
anguish and torment in that: 
(a) Defendant Schettler has an aged mother who would suff e 
physically and mentally if she knew her son had been 
arrested for "Insurance Fraud"; 
(b) No one in the Schettler Family has ever been arrested 
j other than minor traffic violations, and the shame and 
embarrassment to the defendant were more than he could 
bear; 
-4-
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(c) The Schettler name is an honorable name in Utah and 
has been from early pioneer times. The thought that 
defendant was arrested for an act mala in se and 
maybe convicted thereof, and that he would be the firs 
to besmirch the family name, caused the defendant 
great mental and physical anguish and torment. 
3. As a direct consequence of the mental and physical anguish 
and torment suffered by the defendant as the direct result of the 
actions of the plaintiff and third party defendants, Defendant 
Schettler: 
(a) suffered a loss of his own self-esteem; 
(b) has suffered and is suffering from lack of self- con-
fidence; 
(c) his ability to rationalize has been and is lessened; 
(d) Schettler has lost interest in his car business and 
as a direct result his business has gone from a Fifty 
Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollar a month profit to a loss 
per month and he is now being forced to sell the same, 
4. That the actions of the plaintiff and third party defendant 
have caused damage to the Defendant Schettler in the sum of Fifteen 
Million ($15,000,000.00) Dollars. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. For a Second Cause of Action in this Counterclaim, defen-
dant adopts all of the allegations as set forth above as if the 
same were set out fully herein. 
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7 1985 JUN m 2. The conduct of the plaintiff and third party defendants as 
set forth above, were willful, malicious, and deliberate, and done 
with intent to harm the Defendant Schettler and he is entitled to 
punitive damages in the sum of One Hundred Million ($100,000,000.00) 
Dollars. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. Fifteen Million ($15,000,000.00) Dollars on the First 
Cause of Action; 
2. The sum of One Hundred Million ($100,000,000.00) Dollars 
on the Second Cause of Action; 
3. That plaintifffs Complaint be dismissed; 
4. For costs of court and such other and further relief as 
may be just and proper. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 1985. 
«G 'Harold Call &&JL-
Attorney for Defendant Schettler 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer, Counter 
claim and Third Party Complaint was served up the Plaintiff Arnica 
Mutual Insurance by mailing a true copy to its attorney, Lawrence 
JL. Summerhays at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 
[34111, this 10th day of June, 1985. V " 
LO CAUL 
t A I U 
HENRY E. HEATH, 1441 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, ] 
Third-Party ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA ] 
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS & ] 
GUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER, ] 
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE ] 
THEFT BUREAU, ] 
Third-Party ] 
Defendants. ) 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. C85-2687 
1 Judge Dean E. Conder 
Plaintiff, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and 
through its attorneys of record, moves the above-entitled court 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
TO je>£ • A^AZ./^J 
NSfc-y^^SsOUNI I  
BY X 
A2 -1-
summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim of defendant and 
third-party plaintiff, Carl F. Schettler. This motion is made on 
the grounds and for the reasons that as a matter of law, defen-
dant's counterclaim fails to state a cogniiable claim against 
plaintiff. This motion is more particularly based on plaintiff's 
memorandum of points and authorities to be submitted herewith. 
Respectfully submitted this */1 cfiay of May, 1986. 
STRONG & HANNI 
i. Baitd Morgan/ 
Attorneys for ^ lair^fiff 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and Correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion was hand-delivered this H* day of June, 
1986, to the following: 
Edward Flint 
Attorney for Defendant 
3105 Plateau Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Robert Wallace - Mailed First-Class 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Ut^h 84101 
Wesley M. Lang - Mailed First-Class 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utjih 84101 
CfofiJW l^jfliT^ 
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Tc^c/A'^b^.zr: 
HENRY E. HEATH, 1441 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, ) 
Defendant. ] 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, \ 
Third-Party ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAMES M. BLACK and ) 
BARBARA J. BLACK dba BLACK ] 
NICHOLS & GUIVER and R. ; 
LaMAR GUIVER, and NATIONAL ] 
AUTOMOBILE THEFT BUREAU, ] 
Third-Party ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT 
) CARL F. SCHETTLER'S 
) PLEADINGS AND TO ENTER 
> DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
) OF THE PLAINTIFF 
i Civil No. C85-2687 
> Judge Dean E. Conder 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and through its 
attorneys of record, moves the court for an order striking Carl F. 
Schettler's pleadings, including answers, counterclaims, and 
third-party complaints, and entering a default judgment in favor 
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of the plaintiff on the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff Arnica 
reserves the right to seek additional or alternative sanctions as 
provided by law. 
This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum, 
and is based on the pleadings and deposition transcripts on file 
herein. 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company requests oral argument on 
the motion pursuant to Rule 2, Rules of Practice for the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
DATED this day of June, 1986. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By. \Awl\l 
Henry E.' flefeth 
S. Baird Morgan 
Mark J. TW4or 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was hand-delivered this M ^ day of June, 
1986, to: 
Ed Flint 
Attorney for Defendant 
3105 Plateau Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Robert R. Wallace- Mailed first-class 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Wesley M. Lang - Mailed first-class 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
C V u ^ fvy?.i frr^ag, 
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Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
Wesley M. Lang, #4613 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Third Party Defendant 
National Automobile Theft Bureau 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, 
Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA 
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS, 
& GUIVER, and R. LAMAR GUIVER, 
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE THEFT, 
BUREAU, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Third party defendant National Automobile Theft Bureau 
by and through its attorneys of record hereby move this court for 
an order granting it Summary Judgment in the above entitled case. 
This motion is accompanied by a memorandum of points and authori-
ties. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil Number: C 85 2687 
Judge: Dean E. Conder 
- 1 -
.is ^ /_f-day of _Qu n<L DATED thi fa/ ^   \JU n<^ 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
g£ 
Jay E. Je/fs^ rf' 
Wesley M>^ang 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant National Automobile 
Theft Bureau 
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HENRY E. HEATH, \hk\ 
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314 
MARK J-. TAYLOR, 4455 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMIGA MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, \ 
Defendant. \ 
CARL F. SCHETTLER, \ 
Third-Party \ 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA ] 
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS & ) 
GUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER, ) 
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE ) 
THEFT BUREAU, ) 
Third-Party ) 
Defendants. ) 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AND ORDER 
i Civil No. C85-2687 
• Judge Richard Moffat 
WHEREAS, on August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, District Court Judge of the above-entitled court, the 
following motions having come for hearing: 
1. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment; 
2. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to 
Strike Pleadings; 
3. Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to 
Strike Affidavits in Opposition; 
4. Third-party defendant National Automobile Theft 
Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
5. Third-party defendants James Black, Barbara Black, 
dba Black, Nichols & Guiverfs and R. LaMar Guiver1s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
AND WHEREAS, the following parties and counsel being 
present: 
1. Henry E. Heath, S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor, 
attorneys for plaintiff and third-party defendant AMICA Mutual 
Insurance Company; 
2. Robert Wallace, attorney for James Black, Barbara 
Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver, third-
party defendants. 
3. Jay Jensen and Wesley Lang attorneys for National 
Automobile Theft Bureau, third-party defendant; 
4. Phil Hansen and Ed Flint attorneys and Carl Schettler 
personally, for and on behalf of defendant and third-party plain-
tiff Carl F. Schettler. 
AND WHEREAS, the court having heard argument from counsel 
with regard to the above-described motions and having reviewed the 
memoranda, affidavits, depositions and other pleadings of record; 
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AND WHEREAS, the defendant and third-party plaintiff, by 
and through counsel of record having stipulated in open court that 
the cause of action based on conversion be dismissed and also that 
all third-party claims against third-party defendant Barbara Black 
be dismissed and this court having previously so ordered; 
AND WHEREAS, the court expressly finding, pursuant to 
Rule 5i(b) of i:he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no 
just reason for delay and that the dismissal of all claims of the 
counterclaim of defendant and third-party plaintiff shall be a 
final judgment; 
AND WHEREAS, the court having provided additional time to 
defendant and third-party plaintiff to file additional points and 
authorities and affidavits in opposition to said motions and none 
having been filed, and the court being otherwise fully advised in 
the premises now enters its judgment and order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and third-party defendant 
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company is hereby granted. The Motion for 
Summary Judgment of third-party defendant National Automobile 
Theft Bureau is hereby granted. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
of James Black, Barbara Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver and R. 
LaMar Guiver is hereby granted. AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's 
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Elizabeth B. Stewart, Reid W. 
Gerritsen, Debra Ann Murdock, Lisa Hewiston, Lowell V. Summerhays, 
Fredrick W. Green and Jim Hanson in opposition to its Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The Motion of AMICA Mutual 
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Insurance Corapany to Strike Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff's 
Pleadings as Sanctions is hereby reserved for ruling at a later 
t ime. y' 
, 1986. DATED th i s _3 / ^ day of^££ 
BY ATTEST 
. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
deputy Clark 
Judge 
ftKRT?rxe.vrs OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I &£St£SY CE3WIF1* that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Sesaawtry "Judgednt and Order was hand-delivered this day of 
Octobar, 19S6, to the following: 
Phil Hansen 
Attorneys for Carl F. Schcttler 
#800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Robert Wallace 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Wesley Lang 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
#900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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